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THE TRUTH BEHIND ECHOLS V. STATE:
HOW AN ALFORD GUILTY PLEA
SAVED THE WEST MEMPHIS THREE
Kaytee Vota*
After they spent eighteen years in prison for the notorious 1993 murders
of three young boys, the West Memphis Three were released on
August 19, 2011, after they entered Alford pleas. Under an Alford plea,
a defendant can voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly plead
guilty while he simultaneously proclaims his innocence. But with little
evidence linking the West Memphis Three to the crime and with recent
DNA evidence likely establishing their innocence, was it appropriate for
the Circuit Court of Craighead County, Arkansas, to allow the men to
even plead guilty? This Comment argues that the circuit court in
Echols v. State took a step in the wrong direction when it allowed the
West Memphis Three to enter Alford pleas. This Comment discusses the
background of Alford pleas and examines the inherent problems with
their application, particularly in cases that involve DNA evidence.
Finally, this Comment suggests a method of judicial reform that urges
judges to proceed with caution and conduct a stricter factual-basis
inquiry in order to prevent the injustice that arises when they allow
innocent defendants to plead guilty.
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David Costa, for their unconditional support and love.
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I. INTRODUCTION
They listened to heavy metal, wore black clothing, and read
Stephen King novels, and in the eyes of their own community, they
were the enemy.1 In 1994, Damien Echols, Jason Baldwin, and Jessie
Misskelley Jr. were convicted of murdering three eight-year-old boys
in West Memphis, Arkansas.2 Echols, Baldwin, and Misskelley,
collectively known by the media as the “West Memphis Three,”3
pled innocent to the murders.4 With very little evidence to link the
three to the murders, the “satanic panic”5 in West Memphis targeted
Echols, Baldwin, and Misskelley because they “stood out from
everybody else”6—it was a modern-day Salem witch trial.7 Little did
the West Memphis Three know at that time that, eighteen years later,
they would plead guilty to the murders and walk away as “free” men.
In 2002, Echols filed a motion in the Circuit Court of Craighead
County, Arkansas, for DNA testing under the state’s newly approved
DNA-testing statutes.8 Under these statutes, Echols was allowed to

1. See PARADISE LOST: THE CHILD MURDERS AT ROBIN HOOD HILLS (HBO 1996)
[hereinafter PARADISE LOST] (documentary containing actual footage of the West Memphis
Three trials); see also Piers Morgan Tonight: West Memphis Three (CNN television broadcast
Sept. 29, 2011) [hereinafter Piers Morgan] (television interview with Echols and Baldwin one
month after their release from prison).
2. Echols v. State (Echols I), 936 S.W.2d 509, 517 (Ark. 1996).
3. See MARA LEVERITT, DEVIL’S KNOT: THE TRUE STORY OF THE WEST MEMPHIS
THREE 2 (2002); Case Introduction—Brief Overview, EXONERATE THE W. MEMPHIS THREE
SUPPORT FUND, http://www.wm3.org/CaseIntroduction/Page/BRIEF-OVERVIEW (last visited
Feb. 25, 2012) [hereinafter Overview, EXONERATE THE WM3].
4. Case Introduction—Chronology of Events, EXONERATE THE W. MEMPHIS THREE
SUPPORT FUND, http://www.wm3.org/CaseIntroduction/Page/CHRONOLOGY-OF-EVENTS
(last visited Feb. 25, 2012) [hereinafter Chronology, EXONERATE THE WM3]; see PARADISE
LOST, supra note 1.
5. Satanic panic was a phenomenon in the 1980s and 1990s that spread throughout the
United States as a result of hysteria. See JEFFREY S. VICTOR, SATANIC PANIC: THE CREATION OF
A CONTEMPORARY LEGEND 60–61 (1993); see also Mel Maguire, Op-Ed., The Culture of Satanic
Panic, ADVOCATE.COM (Sept. 1, 2011, 1:00:00 AM), http://www.advocate.com/Politics/
Commentary/Op-ed_The_Culture_of_Satanic_Panic (noting the satanic panic that gripped the
town as “rumors swirled”). Baldwin’s defense counsel referred to the satanic panic in his closing
argument. PARADISE LOST, supra note 1.
6. See PARADISE LOST, supra note 1 (Echols discussing how they were the “obvious
choice”).
7. See LEVERITT, supra note 3, at 291 (“[Echols, Baldwin, and Misskelley] began to view
what happened in West Memphis as a modern-day version of the infamous Salem witch trials, in
which rumors and hysteria had supplanted reason, and resulted in executions.”).
8. Echols v. State (Echols II), 2010 Ark. 417, at 3, 2010 Ark. LEXIS 511, at *3.
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bring a motion for DNA testing because “the testing was not
available at the time of the trial” and the testing had “the scientific
potential to produce new noncumulative evidence materially relevant
to [Echols’s] assertion of actual innocence.”9 The DNA testing
occurred between 2005 and 2007 and established that neither Echols
nor the rest of the West Memphis Three was the source of any of the
genetic material that had been gathered from the case.10 Furthermore,
some of the DNA material tested was found to be consistent with that
of Terry Hobbs (one victim’s stepfather) and his friend.11 In response
to these findings,12 Echols filed a motion for a new trial, but the
circuit court denied the motion, claiming that the DNA results were
“inconclusive.”13
Echols appealed the circuit court’s order and on November 4,
2010, the Supreme Court of Arkansas reversed, finding that the
lower court erroneously interpreted the DNA-testing statutes.14
Additionally, the court ruled that in order for a new trial to be
considered, an evidentiary hearing needed to be held to examine the
DNA test results in light of the rest of the evidence presented in the
case.15
On August 19, 2011, before the evidentiary hearing took place,
the West Memphis Three pled guilty to all three murders, all while
asserting their innocence.16 Echols, Baldwin, and Misskelley each
entered what is known as an “Alford plea,”17 and the circuit judge
sentenced the three men to eighteen years and seventy-eight days—

9. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-112-202 (2001) (amended 2005).
10. Echols II, 2010 Ark. LEXIS 511, at *4.
11. Id. Additionally, after the public advocacy group Arkansas Take Action set up a
confidential tip line, new evidence was uncovered, including multiple eyewitness statements that
placed Hobbs with the victims immediately before they disappeared. The West Memphis 3 Are
Free, BUS. WIRE (Aug. 19, 2011, 6:44 PM), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/201108
19005829/en/West-Memphis-3-Free.
12. Echols also submitted findings that many of the victims’ injuries were inflicted
postmortem and that “the jury improperly considered Misskelley’s confession.” Echols II, 2010
Ark. LEXIS 511, at *16 n.3.
13. Id. at *11.
14. Id. at *22–23.
15. Id. at *22.
16. See Max Brantley, Prosecutor’s Statement on West Memphis 3 Plea Deal, Arkansas
Blog, ARK. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2011, 12:11 PM), http://www.arktimes.com/ArkansasBlog/archives/
2011/08/19/prosecutors-statement-on-west-memphis-3-plea-deal.
17. See infra Part III.
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the time they had already served in prison.18 After spending more
than half their lives in jail, the West Memphis Three experienced
freedom as adults for the very first time, but with the weight of
admitting guilt bearing upon them.
This Comment argues that the circuit court’s decision in
Echols v. State19 took a step in the wrong direction when it
countenanced the use of an Alford plea. The court admitted that
“compelling evidence” existed that would acquit the West Memphis
Three in a new trial.20 However, the Alford plea, as used in this case,
allowed the State of Arkansas to appear as though it committed no
wrong when it convicted and incarcerated the three boys nearly two
decades ago. Part II sets forth in more detail the facts of the case and
how the West Memphis Three came to use an Alford plea. Part III
gives the background of Alford pleas, lays the foundation for when
they are used, and discusses the inherent problems with their
application. Part IV discusses the role that DNA evidence played in
this case and why the use of the Alford plea was inappropriate here.
Finally, Part V advocates for reform by urging judges to proceed
with caution and to conduct a heightened standard of review prior to
entering Alford pleas in cases involving DNA evidence.
II. THE MURDERS IN
ROBIN HOOD HILLS
On May 5, 1993, Michael Moore, Christopher Byers, and Steve
Branch never returned to their homes after playing together in their
West Memphis neighborhood.21 The following morning, the three
boys were found dead, floating in a ditch bank in the Robin Hood
Hills of West Memphis, Arkansas.22 Detectives found all three
bodies naked and hog-tied, mutilated with wounds that had been
allegedly caused by a serrated knife, and bruised from what
investigators deemed to be the result of sexual abuse.23 The evidence
18. Campbell Robertson, Rare Deal Frees 3 in ’93 Arkansas Child Killings, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 20, 2011, at A1; see Order of Suspending Imposition of Sentence, and/or Judgment and
Commitment at 1, Arkansas v. Echols, No. CR 1993-450P, 2011 WL 3794204 (Ark. Cir.
Aug. 19, 2011).
19. 936 S.W.2d 509 (Ark. 1996).
20. Conditional Order for New Trial at 3, Arkansas v. Echols, No. CR 93-450A (Ark. Cir.
Aug. 19, 2011).
21. Echols I, 936 S.W.2d 509, 516 (1996).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 516–17.
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collected at the crime scene included the victims’ clothes, their
shoes, and the shoelaces that were used to bind them,24 but there was
no blood in sight.25
Early on in the case, the West Memphis Police decided that the
murders had likely been the result of a satanic ritual.26 The police’s
conclusion led to Echols becoming their prime suspect due to his
self-proclaimed Wiccan practice, asymmetrical black hair, pale skin,
and interest in heavy metal music.27 Working under this assumption,
the police questioned Echols’s friend, Jessie Misskelley, before
Misskelley was even a suspect.28 During the four hours of
interrogation, the police recorded only two fragments of the session,
totaling less than an hour.29 Misskelley then implicated himself,
Echols, and Baldwin as being responsible for the murders30 but
recanted the confession later that evening.31
Misskelley had an IQ of seventy-two and read at a third-grade
level; however, neither the police that questioned him nor the court
found these to be factors that affected his capability to comprehend
the voluntariness of his confession.32 Misskelley’s statements were
24. Id. at 516.
25. See id. at 519 (stating that an expert witness at trial believed the absence of blood at the
scene was due to cult rituals). Defense counsel argued that the nature of the victims’ injuries
without any evidence of blood could have reasonably led to the conclusion that the murders did
not take place at the crime scene. See PARADISE LOST, supra note 1.
26. See Jennifer L. Mnookin, Op-Ed., False Convictions, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2011, at
A11; PARADISE LOST, supra note 1.
27. See Mnookin, supra note 26; see also PARADISE LOST, supra note 1 (Echols explained
how the police had to find somebody because they were “under a lot of pressure” and “had to do
something fast”). See generally Echols I, 936 S.W.2d at 517 (stating that detectives questioned
Misskelley when Echols was a suspect because it was known that Echols, Baldwin, and
Misskelley engaged in “cult-like activities”).
28. Misskelley v. State, 915 S.W.2d 702, 707 (Ark. 1996).
29. Overview, EXONERATE THE WM3, supra note 3 (“[Police] subjected [Misskelley] . . . to
hours of questioning without counsel or parental consent, audio-taping only two fragments
totaling [forty-six] minutes.”); see PARADISE LOST, supra note 1; see also Misskelley, 915
S.W.2d at 712, 714 (stating that Misskelley was advised of his rights over the course of four
hours and that the police’s failure to record the interrogation in its entirety did not invalidate the
confession).
30. Misskelley, 915 S.W.2d at 706.
31. Overview, EXONERATE THE WM3, supra note 3; PARADISE LOST, supra note 1.
32. See Misskelley, 915 S.W.2d at 712; PARADISE LOST, supra note 1. Misskelley was tried
separately from Echols and Baldwin. Echols I, 936 S.W.2d at 517. Misskelley’s confession was
not allowed to be used in Echols and Baldwin’s trial; however, the jury knew of the confession
when an officer on cross-examination “‘blurted out’ that Misskelley confessed.” Id. at 542.
Instead of granting the defense’s motion for mistrial, the court merely instructed the jury to ignore
the statement. Id. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arkansas found that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion by refusing to grant a mistrial. Id. at 542–43.

1008

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:1003

the strongest and “virtually the only evidence” offered against him at
his trial,33 yet, in the eyes of the jury, the several inconsistencies in
his statements did not appear to affect his credibility.34
At Echols and Baldwin’s trial, witnesses testified to hearing
Echols admit to the killings,35 but no tangible evidence or motive
linked the West Memphis Three to the victims.36 The prosecution
brought an expert in occultism to testify that the killings closely
resembled cult-like rituals, but on cross-examination, the witness’s
qualifications as an expert were significantly undermined.37
Nonetheless, a panicked community and a rush to judgment were
apparently strong enough to tip the scales against the West Memphis
Three.38 Accordingly, Baldwin and Misskelley were both sentenced
to life in prison and Echols received the death penalty for the
murders of Moore, Byers, and Branch.39

33. Misskelley, 915 S.W.2d at 707.
34. See id. at 708–10.
35. Echols I, 936 S.W.2d at 518. The witnesses were a twelve-year-old girl and a fifteenyear-old girl. See Chris Worthington, Case Info—Evidence Analysis, EXONERATE THE W.
MEMPHIS THREE SUPPORT FUND, http://www.wm3.org/Evidence/Page/Evidence-Analysis (last
visited Feb. 25, 2012) [hereinafter Evidence Analysis, EXONERATE THE WM3] (discussing
Echols’s overheard confession on linked pages 16 and 17). Both testified to overhearing Echols
say he killed the victims, but upon cross-examination, neither witness could account for any other
part of the statements heard nor the context in which she heard them. See PARADISE LOST, supra
note 1; Evidence Analysis, EXONERATE THE WM3, supra.
36. See LEVERITT, supra note 3, at 337; see also Echols I, 936 S.W.2d at 518–19 (describing
the prosecution’s evidence against Echols). A knife was found in a lake behind Baldwin’s home,
and although there were no fingerprints or blood to connect the knife to the crime, the prosecution
immediately concluded that it was reasonable to believe that the knife was the murder weapon. Id.
at 541–42. The prosecution relied on the belief that the murders “were done in a satanic ritual”
and used this as its theory of motive. Id. at 519. Drawings of upside-down crosses and
pentagrams along with other “morbid images and references” found in Echols’s room supported
this theory. Id.
37. See PARADISE LOST, supra note 1. The witness, Dr. Dale Griffis, admitted on crossexamination that he received his doctorate from a mail-order form and did not receive any formal
classroom training. Id.; see LEVERITT, supra note 3, at 236–37 (detailing the discovery that the
prosecutor’s cult expert had received his Ph.D. from a mail-order form and did not receive any
formal classroom training). However, the jury found Griffis’s testimony of having read 4,800
books on occultism to be a compelling reason for convicting the defendants. See id. at 275.
38. See The West Memphis 3 Are Free, supra note 11, at 3; see also Overview, EXONERATE
THE WM3, supra note 3, at 1 (“The police and the state managed to convince the media and the
juries that ‘devil worshippers’ were responsible, and that [Echols, Baldwin, and Misskelley]
somehow fit that description. It was publicly stated by law enforcement officials and the media
that the murders had been a part of a satanic ritual.”).
39. Echols I, 936 S.W.2d at 516; Misskelley, 915 S.W.2d at 707.
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For almost two decades, Echols, Baldwin, and Misskelley each
attempted to appeal their convictions but were unsuccessful.40 Echols
was able to get his execution date postponed but still faced the
uncertainty of not knowing when his final day would come.41
Finally, in 2002, an opportunity opened up for the West Memphis
Three that shed new light on the case: Arkansas enacted new DNAtesting statutes,42 and the West Memphis Three promptly moved the
court to reopen the case and test the evidence previously collected.43
The DNA testing failed to link Echols, Baldwin, or Misskelley to any
of the victims.44 Relying primarily on these DNA testing results,
Echols moved for a new trial in 2008.45 Echols also offered other
evidence that “questioned the reliability of other aspects of the
State’s evidence.”46 This evidence included affidavits admitting juror
misconduct in the original trial47 and the opinions of multiple
forensic specialists who concluded that most of the injuries to the
victims resulted from postmortem animal predation and not from a
serrated knife.48 Without holding an evidentiary hearing, the circuit
court denied Echols’s motion for a new trial.49
In 2010, the Supreme Court of Arkansas reversed the circuit
court’s order and found that the circuit court erred in denying Echols
a new trial.50 The supreme court found that the DNA test results
should have been considered in the lower court’s assessment of
whether Echols presented “compelling evidence that a new trial
would result in an acquittal,” and it remanded for an evidentiary

40. See Echols v. Arkansas, 520 U.S. 1244 (1997); Misskelley v. Arkansas, 519 U.S. 898
(1996); Echols v. State (Echols III), 42 S.W.3d 467 (2001); Echols I, 936 S.W.2d 509.
41. See Piers Morgan, supra note 1.
42. See supra text accompanying notes 8–9.
43. See id.
44. See supra text accompanying notes 10–11.
45. Echols II, 2010 Ark. 417, at 4, 2010 Ark. LEXIS 511, at *4.
46. David S. Mitchell, Jr., Lock ‘Em Up and Throw Away the Key: “The West Memphis
Three” and Arkansas’s Statute for Post-Conviction Relief Based on New Scientific Evidence, 62
ARK. L. REV. 501, 506–07 (2009).
47. See Damien Echols’ Brief on the Admissibility of Evidence of Juror Misconduct at 28–
36, Echols II, 2010 Ark. LEXIS 511 (No. CR-93-450A), available at http://www.freewest
memphis3.org/images/stories/pdfs/finalmisconductbrief.pdf.
48. Mitchell, Jr., supra note 46, at 507; see also Echols II, 2010 Ark. LEXIS 511, at *16 n.3
(describing Echols’s submission of various forensic specialists’ investigative results to the circuit
court); supra note 12 and accompanying text (describing the source of the victims’ injuries).
49. See supra text accompanying note 13.
50. See Echols II, 2010 Ark. LEXIS 511, at *23.
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hearing.51 On August 19, 2011, four months before the evidentiary
hearing was to take place, the West Memphis Three pled guilty to the
murders with an Alford plea and were released from prison.52
III. ALFORD PLEAS—
WHAT ARE THEY?
Pleas come in a variety of forms.53 Under the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, defendants may plead not guilty, guilty, or nolo
contendere.54 Additionally, defendants may enter what is known as
an Alford plea, which allows them to plead guilty while
simultaneously proclaiming their innocence.55
In 1963, Henry Alford was indicted for first-degree murder.56
Faced with the death penalty and with strong evidence against him,
Alford avoided going to trial by pleading guilty to second-degree
murder while, at the same time, refusing to admit that he was, in fact,
guilty.57 In North Carolina v. Alford,58 the U.S. Supreme Court
found the plea that Alford used to be constitutional, holding that a
defendant may “voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent
to the imposition of a prison sentence even if . . . [he submits] a plea
containing a protestation of innocence.”59 Furthermore, the Court
required a clear demonstration of a “strong factual basis” for the plea
in order for it to pass constitutional muster.60 Unable to draw any
51. Id. at *22.
52. See Suzie Parker, After 18 Years, “West Memphis 3” Go Free on Plea Deal, REUTERS
(Aug. 19, 2011, 3:41 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/19/us-crime-westmemphis3arkansas-idUSTRE77I54A20110819.
53. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(a).
54. Id. A nolo contendere (no contest) plea has been viewed as a “mild form of pleading
guilty” and consists of a statement by the defendant that he will not contend against the charge
made by the state. See C. T. Drechsler, Annotation, Plea of Nolo Contendere or Non Vult
Contendere, 89 A.L.R.2d 540 (1963) (discussing the use of nolo contendere pleas and their
effects and implications). Additionally, the court must consent to the use of a nolo contendere
plea. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(a)(2).
55. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
56. Id. at 26.
57. Id. at 28–29.
58. 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
59. Id. at 37.
60. See id. at 38. Normally, a court need only find that a defendant has a factual basis for his
plea. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(3). Some federal courts, however, have chosen not to acknowledge a
difference between Alford pleas and regular guilty pleas when it comes to finding a factual basis
for the plea, requiring only a factual basis for either plea. See, e.g., United States v. Tunning, 69
F.3d 107, 111 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that there is no difference between a defendant who pleads
guilty and admits to acts constituting the crime and a defendant who pleads guilty and
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material difference between a nolo contendere plea and a plea
containing an active protestation of innocence, the Court recognized
that the admission of guilt was “not a constitutional requisite to the
imposition of criminal penalty.”61
A. The Problem with Alford Pleas
Plea bargaining is typically seen as an advantageous tool for
defendants, but there are certainly drawbacks to using the Alford
plea. Some courts reject Alford pleas in order to “further the correct
resolution of criminal cases,”62 while other courts simply fear the
risk of inaccuracy and inconsistency.63 Another significant concern
regarding Alford pleas is the message that they send to the public.
When an Alford plea is used, the concern is that it will “imply[] that
the law does not care” about justice64—that “[t]ruth, justice, selfrestraint, and respect for others take a back seat to procedural
efficiency and freedom of choice.”65 The most significant problem,
however, is when an actual innocent defendant uses the Alford
plea.66 How can we allow a defendant who is actually innocent to
admit guilt in front of his attorney, the judge, and the adverse party?
In Alford, while the Supreme Court required a “strong factual
basis” for Alford’s plea, the Court also suggested that the basic
standard be just a “factual basis”67—which is to say that a court must
have some reason to believe that the defendant might be guilty.68
However, in theory, since few defendants are arrested and charged
for crimes without some kind of evidence against them, virtually

affirmatively protests his innocence); United States v. Morrow, 914 F.2d 608, 612 (4th Cir. 1990)
(“[A]ny Rule 11 proceeding requires that a factual basis for the plea be established and we are
unwilling to place more requirements in the context of an Alford plea.”).
61. Alford, 400 U.S. at 37.
62. Norris v. State, 896 N.E.2d 1149, 1155 (2008) (Boehm, J., concurring).
63. See Stephanos Bibas, Harmonizing Substantive-Criminal-Law Values and Criminal
Procedure: The Case of Alford and Nolo Contendere Pleas, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1361, 1381
(2003).
64. Id. at 1403.
65. Id.
66. Cf. F. Andrew Hessick III & Reshma Saujani, Plea Bargaining and Convicting the
Innocent: The Role of the Prosecutor, the Defense Counsel, and the Judge, 16 BYU J. PUB. L.
189, 197–200 (2002) (exploring different roles in the plea-bargain system).
67. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38 & n.10 (1970).
68. Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J.
1179, 1293 (1975).
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every defendant in the criminal justice system might be guilty and,
therefore, have some sort of factual basis for an Alford plea.69
The Alford Court seemed more concerned with allowing a
defendant to take control of the outcome of his case by “voluntarily,
knowingly, and understandingly consent[ing]” to enter a guilty plea70
rather than with ascertaining whether a defendant believes that he is
actually guilty. The Court reasoned that whether or not Alford
realized his guilt, he used the plea because he believed that he had
“absolutely nothing to gain by a trial and much to gain by
pleading.”71
The West Memphis Three appeared to follow the Alford Court’s
reasoning when they entered their Alford pleas. There is no doubt
that Echols, Baldwin, and Misskelley believed that they were
innocent; however, in this case, the defendants used the Alford plea
not for its truth-seeking function72 but to establish a “middle ground”
in the eighteen-year battle between the prosecution and defense.73
B. Why Defendants Continue to Use Alford Pleas
Judges have the discretion to deny Alford pleas,74 but most
states have permitted their use.75 Scholars have praised Alford pleas
as being an “efficient, constitutional means of resolving cases” and
as a way to “empower defendants within a flawed system.”76
Supporters also endorse Alford pleas as “further[ing] the interests of
defendants . . . who want to avoid worse outcomes at trial,”77 while
others see the pleas as simply protecting the dignity of defendants by
preventing them from having to face public humiliation.78 The types

69. Id.
70. See Alford, 400 U.S. at 37 (emphasis added).
71. Id.
72. See generally Jenny Elayne Ronis, The Pragmatic Plea: Expanding Use of the Alford
Plea to Promote Traditionally Conflicting Interests of the Criminal Justice System, 82 TEMP. L.
REV. 1389, 1416 (2010) (discussing how the Alford plea’s emphasis on requiring an independent
factual basis promotes truth-seeking).
73. See Sheri Qualters, Defender Found the Audacity to End a Stalemate, NAT’L LAW
JOURNAL (Jan. 2, 2012), http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202537061339&
slreturn=1 (“The thing that seemed logical, the only safe harbor, was the Alford plea.”).
74. Alford, 400 U.S. at 38 n.11. Judges have discretion to accept or deny any type of plea.
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(3)(A).
75. See Bibas, supra note 63, at 1372 n.52.
76. Id. at 1363.
77. Id. at 1373.
78. Id. at 1374.
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of cases that typically see Alford pleas include sex offenses, heinous
murders, and domestic violence.79 These cases often involve
“difficult defendants” who refuse to admit to committing the
crimes.80 In those cases, Alford pleas serve as a tool to ameliorate the
shame that defendants may face and to alleviate their fear that their
loved ones could reject them.81
As the debate over the strengths and weaknesses of the Alford
plea continues, there is no denying that the U.S. Supreme Court has
found the plea constitutional and that thousands of criminal
defendants enter Alford pleas every year.82 However, while the
requirements of the Alford plea have not changed since 1970, it is
unclear whether the Court logically contemplated future
technological advances in obtaining evidence and how they might fit
into a court’s inquiry into the “factual basis for the plea.” It is likely
that “the quality of the evidence that most courts . . . demand to
support the plea will fall short of that required by traditional rules of
evidence and due process.”83 But what if the evidence presented is
scientific evidence that not only falls short of establishing guilt but
also presents a compelling claim of actual innocence? Surely, when
it stated in a footnote that it believed in the importance of protecting
the innocent,84 the Alford Court did not anticipate the development of
technological advances that would provide for the scientific
establishment of actual innocence, nor the part that these
developments would play in meeting the “factual basis for the plea”
standard.
IV. DNA EVIDENCE
IN THE COURTROOM
The legal system has seen the introduction of innumerable
technological advances over the years, and genetic identification is
now a common tool used in the courtroom. DNA evidence has
exonerated the innocent, confirmed the guilty, established paternity,
79. Id. at 1378–79.
80. Id. at 1379.
81. See id. at 1378.
82. See Anne D. Gooch, Note, Admitting Guilt by Professing Innocence: When Sentence
Enhancements Based on Alford Pleas Are Unconstitutional, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1755, 1765–66
(2010).
83. Alschuler, supra note 68, at 1295.
84. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38 n.10 (1970).
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and allowed law enforcement to link crimes to persons who are
already in their databases.85 As with all other things, DNA
technology in the courtroom has both benefits and drawbacks, which
are rapidly changing the American justice system while
simultaneously presenting new legal dilemmas.86
A. DNA Evidence in the West Memphis Three Case
At the time of the West Memphis Three trial, DNA evidence had
just begun to make its debut in courtrooms across the nation.87 In
2001, Arkansas introduced its DNA testing statutes to further “the
mission of the criminal justice system . . . [and] to accommodate the
advent of new technologies enhancing the ability to analyze new
scientific evidence.”88 The West Memphis Three promptly moved
for DNA testing under these new statutes, and the testing occurred
between 2005 and 2007.89 A penile swab from one of the victims,
hairs recovered from a tree stump at the crime scene, and hairs from
a shoelace used to bind the victims were among the biological
material tested, but they failed to link the West Memphis Three to
any of the victims.90 Instead, the DNA was found to be consistent
with one victim’s stepfather and his friend.91
After Echols appealed to the Supreme Court of Arkansas
requesting a new hearing, the court granted him an evidentiary
hearing to “consider the DNA-test results ‘with all other evidence in
the case . . .’ to determine if [it could be] ‘establish[ed] by
compelling evidence that a new trial would result in an acquittal.’”92
Although the DNA test results might have been “legally
85. See Julie A. Singer et al., The Impact of DNA and Other Technology on the Criminal
Justice System: Improvements and Complications, 17 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 87, 89–93 (2007).
86. See id. at 117–23.
87. See generally EDWARD CONNORS ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, CONVICTED BY
JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO
ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL 4–7 (1996), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/
dnaevid.pdf (discussing the increase in acceptance of DNA technology in the courts); George
Bundy Smith & Janet A. Gordon, The Admission of DNA Evidence in State and Federal Courts,
65 FORDHAM L. REV. 2465, 2481–86 (1997) (discussing the history of DNA evidence in the
United States).
88. Echols II, 2010 Ark. 417, at 5–6, 2010 Ark. LEXIS 511, at *5–6 (quoting Act of Apr. 19,
2001, No. 1780, 2001 Ark. Acts 7736 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 116-112-201 to -207
(Supp. 2001) (amended 2005))).
89. See supra text accompanying notes 8–10.
90. Echols II, 2010 Ark. LEXIS 511, at *4.
91. Id.
92. Id. at *22.
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inconclusive,”93 they were “scientifically conclusive” because they
showed that the West Memphis Three could not have been the source
of the material tested.94 Additionally, not only did the DNA test
results exclude Echols, Baldwin, and Misskelley as sources of
“several pieces of biological material that [had] differing connections
to the crime scene . . . [but the results also failed to] exclude other
persons connected to one of the victims.”95
At the outset of the case, then-prosecutor John Fogleman
admitted that the crime scene was “spotless” and that “[t]here was a
remarkable lack of physical evidence against anybody.”96 The fact
that the newly presented DNA evidence significantly undermined the
little—yet only—evidence that convicted the West Memphis Three
would likely cast reasonable doubt in the minds of any juror. Indeed,
the Supreme Court of Arkansas correctly found that a new trial
would likely result in an acquittal in light of this compelling new
DNA evidence.
B. DNA Evidence in General
For the past twenty years, the introduction of DNA evidence
into the courtroom has continued to shake the criminal justice
system.97 DNA evidence has proven actual innocence in cases where
individuals have been convicted based on otherwise “solid and
substantial evidence.”98 To this day, more than 280 people have been
exonerated due to postconviction DNA relief.99 This solid and
substantial evidence on which courts had relied before DNA
evidence included eyewitness testimony, coerced confessions,

93. See id. at *13 (“[I]t is unclear to this court how DNA test results alone could ever
produce legally-conclusive evidence of innocence . . . .”).
94. Id. at *14.
95. Id. at *16.
96. M.V. Moorhead, The Lost Boys: Metalhead Murder Trial Exhumed in Documentary
Paradise Lost, PHOENIX NEW TIMES, Nov. 14, 1996.
97. See Walter F. Rowe, Foreword to EDWARD CONNORS ET AL., supra note 87, at xv;
Rockne Harmon, Foreword to EDWARD CONNORS ET AL., supra note 87, at xix; see also Singer
et al., supra note 85, at 96–97 (discussing how the most important technological advance
benefitting the criminal justice system has been DNA testing).
98. See Seth F. Kreimer & David Rudovsky, Double Helix, Double Bind: Factual Innocence
and Postconviction DNA Testing, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 547, 595 (2002).
99. About—Mission Statement, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/
about/Mission-Statement.php (last visited Oct. 19, 2011).
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government conduct, and other forms of forensic science.100
Unfortunately, in many cases, eyewitness testimony has been shown
to be highly unreliable, confessions have been false, and government
conduct and other forms of forensic science have been improper.101
With the gradual movement of Innocence Projects102 securing
the release of innocent individuals from prison, “legislators [have]
recognized the importance of DNA testing postconviction.”103 DNA
testing statutes have been implemented in almost all fifty states,104
and the federal government has sought to establish a guideline for
states to improve and expand on postconviction DNA testing
procedures.105 The U.S. Supreme Court has even acknowledged that
“DNA testing has an unparalleled ability both to exonerate the
wrongly convicted and to identify the guilty.”106 DNA evidence has
the capability to be dispositive—while it does not have the capability
to prove an individual “innocent in the eyes of the law,” it does have
the power to scientifically prove an individual’s innocence.107
Indeed, this powerful claim of actual innocence has a unique force in
our criminal justice system that can tip the scales of justice in a
defendant’s favor.

100. See Understand the Causes, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/
understand/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2011); see also EDWARD CONNORS ET AL., supra note 87, at 15,
18–20 (discussing evidence used in trials that led to wrongful convictions); Peter Neufeld &
Barry C. Scheck, Foreword to EDWARD CONNORS ET AL., supra note 87, at xxx (“Mistaken
eyewitness identification, coerced confessions, unreliable forensic laboratory work, law
enforcement misconduct, and ineffective representation . . . remain the leading causes of wrongful
convictions.”).
101. See generally CONNORS ET AL., supra note 87, at 24–25 (discussing the unreliability of
eyewitness testimony and non-DNA analyses of forensic evidence); Priority Issues: Eyewitness
Identification, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/fix/EyewitnessIdentification.php (last visited Oct. 16, 2011) (“The most common element in all wrongful
convictions later overturned by DNA evidence has been eyewitness misidentification.”).
102. “The Innocence Project is a national . . . organization dedicated to exonerating
wrongfully convicted individuals through DNA testing and reforming the criminal justice
system . . . .” INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org (last visited Oct. 16, 2011).
103. Brandon L. Garrett, DNA and Due Process, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2919, 2921–22
(2010).
104. Id. at 2922.
105. See Justice for All Act of 2004, H.R. 5107, 108th Cong. (2nd Sess. 2004); U.S. DEPT. OF
JUSTICE, OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIMES (OVC) FACT SHEET, THE JUSTICE FOR ALL ACT 1
(2006), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/publications/factshts/justforall/fs000311.pdf.
106. Dist. Attorney’s Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2312 (2009).
107. See Kreimer & Rudovsky, supra note 98, at 599 (quoting United States v. Herrera, 506
U.S. 390, 419 (1993) (O’Connor, J., concurring)).
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C. Should There Be More Scrutiny Before
Courts Accept Alford Pleas in DNA Cases?
At the time when Alford was decided, DNA evidence did not yet
exist in the courtroom,108 and it is difficult to know whether the
Supreme Court actually anticipated the forthcoming revolution in
forensic science. The Alford Court rendered it constitutional for a
defendant to plead guilty while concurrently maintaining his
innocence when there is a clear demonstration of a “strong factual
basis for the plea.”109 But can there actually be a strong factual
basis—or even just a plain factual basis—for guilt if scientific
evidence proves otherwise?
As discussed above, DNA findings have definitively resulted in
establishing innocence.110 If DNA evidence is powerful enough to
prove an individual’s actual innocence, then a court must carefully
examine this evidence to determine if there is a factual basis for an
Alford plea. Not doing so would only open the doors of injustice and
allow innocent defendants to slide right past the judges and into our
prisons.
Furthermore, the Alford Court held that an Alford plea is
constitutional as long as the plea consists of “a voluntary and
intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action.”111 It
would be difficult to imagine a defendant with compelling DNA
evidence that established his innocence voluntarily and intelligently
admitting guilt unless, of course, there were no other alternative
courses of action to choose from. In order for a defendant to avoid
such a dilemma, it is important for courts to apply a standard of strict
scrutiny before they accept Alford pleas in these instances. Only
such a detailed and probing inquiry can help provide an additional
safeguard to the innocent defendant.

108. Alford, decided in 1970, preceded the DNA revolution that hit the courtrooms in the late
1980s. See Garrett, supra note 103, at 2921.
109. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37–38 (1970).
110. See supra text accompanying notes 98–100; see also Jay D. Aronson & Simon A. Cole,
Science and the Death Penalty: DNA, Innocence, and the Debate over Capital Punishment in the
United States, 34 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 603, 617 (2009) (explaining how DNA evidence can
provide epistemological closure for disputed convictions).
111. Alford, 400 U.S. at 31.
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V. THE NEED
FOR REFORM
The Circuit Court of Craighead County, Arkansas, should have
dismissed the West Memphis Three case rather than let the
defendants enter Alford pleas. The court failed to focus on the
evidence in the case and thus allowed the defendants to plead guilty
when a guilty plea clearly should not have been used. Indeed,
although the West Memphis Three fought an eighteen-year battle to
achieve their freedom, an Alford plea was the wrong vehicle to
administer this achievement. In the end, what the West Memphis
Three obtained was defective freedom.
At the heart of our criminal justice system lie the constitutional
goals of providing fairness and protection of individual rights for
all.112 The system is not perfect. Economic pressures leading to a
deficiency in resources, overcriminalization, faulty procedures and
practices, and wrongful convictions of innocent individuals are just a
few of the problems contributing to this broken system.113 With these
imperfections in mind, it is essential to address the challenges and
aim to further the progression and improvement of our criminal
justice system.
Here, the underlying issue is whether a court should
countenance the use of an Alford plea when evidence exists—
especially DNA evidence—proving that the person is in fact
innocent of the crime charged. The answer is simple: no.
The West Memphis Three entered Alford pleas because they
“felt it was in their ‘best interest’” to do so.114 Upon his release from
prison, Echols stated: “Sometimes justice is neither pretty nor is it
perfect, but it was important to take this opportunity to be free.”115 It
is no surprise that the West Memphis Three believed that it was in
their “best interest” to plead guilty. With Echols’s looming execution
date or the potential of another drawn-out trial, the Alford plea

112. See PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 138–39, 154 (1967).
113. See THE SMART ON CRIME COALITION, SMART ON CRIME: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
THE ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESS, at xi–iii (2011), http://www.besmartoncrime.org/pdf/
Executive_Summary.pdf.
114. Kenneth Heard et al., 3 Plead Guilty to Murders, Are Set Free, ARK. DEMOCRATIC
GAZETTE, Aug. 20, 2011, at 6A.
115. The West Memphis 3 Are Free, supra note 11.
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appeared to be the best option.116 Although, as mentioned above,
there are reasons why individuals find Alford pleas to be beneficial,
it is doubtful that this case illustrates the rationalization for those
benefits.
Nonetheless, the West Memphis Three cannot be grouped into
the same category as innocent individuals who plead guilty to crimes
that they did not commit merely to avoid harsher punishments117 or
“recidivist innocent defendants” who simply want to avoid the costs
of taking a case to trial.118 Echols, Baldwin, and Misskelley
presented the court with scientifically conclusive evidence indicating
their innocence—not even procedural efficiency can justify such an
unsubstantiated guilty plea here or ignore the importance of
innocence and fairness.119
In our criminal justice system, all elements necessary to
constitute the crime charged must be established beyond a
reasonable doubt120—which is consistent with the requirements of
due process.121 If that standard is not met, the defendant must be
acquitted.122 To say that reasonable doubt is not cast upon the mind
of a reasonable person when the existence of DNA evidence shows
an individual’s innocence is nonsensical.
Here, the finger must not be pointed at the “reasonable person”
but instead at the judge. Judges must take seriously their independent
responsibility to ensure that they can support an Alford plea with a
true, factual basis.123 Judges must not abuse their discretion when
they confront an Alford plea;124 they must not “fall[] prey to the
116. See Piers Morgan, supra note 1.
117. Gooch, supra note 82, at 1761–62; see also Laurie L. Levenson, Unnerving the Judges:
Judicial Responsibility for the Rampart Scandal, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 787, 819 (2001)
(observing that defendants facing life imprisonment under California’s Three Strikes Law may
feel pressured to forego the right to trial).
118. Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117, 1130–36 (2008)
(discussing the benefits for innocent defendants in low-stakes cases to plea bargain in order to
avoid the high costs of trial).
119. See Bibas, supra note 63, at 1408.
120. 1A FED. JURY PRAC. & INSTR. § 12:10 (5th ed.) (“Proof beyond a reasonable doubt
must . . . be proof of such a convincing character that a reasonable person would not hesitate to
rely and act upon it in the most important of his or her own affairs.”).
121. 2A FED. PRAC. & PROC. CRIM. § 403 (4th ed.) (“The requirement that the prosecution
has the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required by due process.”).
122. Laura Alexander, Proof Issues, 35 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 641, 641–42
(2006).
123. Levenson, supra note 117, at 815–18.
124. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
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practice of routinely skipping over the factual basis” inquiry.125 In
other words, judges must not sit idly by and let innocent defendants
plead guilty when evidence proves otherwise.
When a judge is confronted with compelling evidence of actual
innocence, he or she can either (1) allow the innocent defendant to
plead guilty, which would be a complete misuse of justice and a
bastardization of our criminal justice system; or (2) dismiss the case.
A guilty plea is not only an admission of conduct, it is a
conviction.126 Therefore, judges must provide an additional
safeguard for these defendants and not condone such a lax
examination of factual basis. When the evidence shows innocence,
the court simply should not accept the guilty plea.
The circuit court found “compelling evidence” that a new trial
would result in an acquittal, yet it consented to Echols, Baldwin, and
Misskelley signing on record that they each caused the deaths of the
three boys and knew or had reason to know that the victims were
particularly vulnerable.127 Considering the wide media attention that
this case received and the enhanced criticism of the way in which the
trial was conducted, the circuit court should have taken a more
cautious approach by examining the evidence presented with strict
scrutiny rather than quickly acting to make the case disappear.
Under this heightened standard of review, courts cannot evade
the central purposes of the Alford plea by allowing one to be entered
prior to conducting a close assessment of all the facts at hand.
Efficiency should not come at the price of unfair adjudication.128 In
order to ensure a higher quality of justice, judges cannot remain
passive. Rather, they should make every effort to take responsibility
to fulfill their constitutional obligations and “contribute to the
improvement of . . . the administration of justice.”129
Here, the circuit court failed to take on that responsibility and
missed an opportunity to identify and redress one of the many
problems in our justice system. Consequently, the injustice that

125. Levenson, supra note 117, at 817.
126. Id. at 798.
127. Conditional Order For New Trial at 3, Arkansas v. Echols, No. CR 93-450 (Ark. Cir.
Aug. 19, 2011) (emphasis added); Prosecutor’s Short Report of Circumstances at 1, Echols v.
State, 2010 Ark. 417, 2010 Ark. LEXIS 511 (No. CR-93-450A).
128. Levenson, supra note 117, at 819.
129. See id. at 803 (quoting MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4B (2000)).
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occurred resulted in the West Memphis Three acquiring their
freedom at the cost of their innocence.
VI. CONCLUSION
The circuit court’s decision in Echols v. State was an immense
step backward in the progression of our criminal justice system.
Courts should not accept guilty pleas when enough compelling
evidence exists that clearly shows that an individual is not linked to
the crime for which he or she has been charged. Judges must not sit
back with their hands tied; instead, they must take the responsibility
to conduct a factual-basis inquiry with strict scrutiny in order to
prevent the injustice of allowing an innocent defendant to plead
guilty. The Echols court’s allowance of an Alford plea was
inappropriate because there was enough evidence to establish the
West Memphis Three’s innocence but not enough of a factual basis
for the Alford plea. As a result, the West Memphis Three have to
bear the weight of admitting guilt while scientific evidence lurks
within the shadows of doubt that could ultimately lift that weight off.
If Arkansas truly seeks to carry out “the mission of the criminal
justice system . . . and accommodate the advent of new
technologies . . . [and] new scientific evidence,”130 then the court
should have viewed the DNA results from this case as being
compelling evidence of factual innocence and dismissed this case.
West Memphis Three supporters spent eighteen years and
seventy-eight days asking the court to “Free the West Memphis
Three.”131 And while Echols, Baldwin, and Misskelley are surely
“free” from sitting behind bars for the rest of their lives, the Alford
plea has certainly not freed them from guilt.

130. See supra text accompanying note 88.
131. See, e.g., EXONERATE THE WEST MEMPHIS THREE SUPPORT FUND, http://wm3.org (last
visited Feb. 25, 2012); FREE WEST MEMPHIS 3, http://www.freewestmemphis3.org (last visited
Oct. 17, 2011).
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